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Traditional discussions of the role of capital markets have identified a numher of
distinct functions which they perfonn; they allocate scarce capital among competing
users and uses,' and they provide signals to guide managers in making their in-
vestment decisions.^ In this lecture, I wish to focus on a rather different function of
the capital market: what I shall refer to as the control of capital. ^
Conventional theory treats the typical firm in an anthropomorphic manner: it acts
as a single, rational, individual dokig what it is supposed to be doing, maximizing
stock market value. That may bave been well and good in those nostalgic bygone
days of small firms, each ran tightly by their owners who were single-mindedly
pursuing their lust for wealth. But today a majority of production occurs in large
corporations, in which no shareholder owns more than a small fraction of the shares,
in which the separation of ownership and control that Frank Knight was so con-
cerned with in bis writings some sixty-five years ago has become a reality. Those
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who manage these corporations control enormous amounts of capital. If they per-
form their functions well, the economy, and the shareholders of the firms, will
prosper. If they do not perform their functions well, or if they divert the resources
of the firm to their own personal use, both the economy and the shareholders will
suffer. The question which I wish to address today is, what are the mechanisms in
our society by which we ensure that those entrusted with the management of these
resources do their job well? What are the institutions by which "control" is exerted
over those who control capital? Are they effective? Could they be made more
effective?
At the onset, it may be useful for me to present an overview of the argument which
I shall present. In the first section, I shall review the traditional theory of the
firm—the owner-managed firm. In this view, when the owner himself does not
manage the firm, managers manage in the shareholders' interest; banks are like
suppliers of pencils or toilet paper; each supplies a necessary ingredient in the
production process of the firm, and there is no more reason to ascribe control to
banks than to suppliers of these other inputs. There was a Populist view, common
in the late nineteenth century, that banks were running the country; and there has
been a continuing tradition in economics (particularly among institutional econo-
mists) that, even if banks do not run firms, managers do, in their own interests, and
not necessarily in the interests of the shareholder. Modem theorists have, for the
most part, dismissed this view: they have argued that there are mechanisms which
ensure that managers who do not act in the interests of their shareholders get
replaced. I would like to think of this as a triumph of theory over facts, which would
bode well for theorists like myself; in fact, it appears to be more a triumph of
ideology over theory and fact. The fact of the matter is that economic theory, taking
into account costs of information, risk aversion, and the "public good" nature of
management, is more consistent with what I shall loosely refer to as the Populist
view than with what I shall call the nineteenth-century model of the firm.'*'^  Share-
holders do not control the firm, and managers do not necessarily act in their interests.
Although I do not prove any theorems in this paper, I draw upon recent de-
velopments in the economics of information, particularly those developments
which have focused on the problems of control (what have come to be called
"principal-agent" problems), in which one individual attempts, through indirect
control devices, to induce another to act in his own interests.* We argue that the
problem at hand may most appropriately be viewed as a multiple-principal-agent
"These attempts to encapsulate broad theories in single sentences will, no doubt, offend partisans of
all these theories; any linking of these theories with particular periods will no doubt offend historians of
economic thought. My only apology is that space limitations make some caricature of these opposing
views necessary, and that in any case, the caricature serves the useful function of bringing out more
clearly the particular views that I wish to stress.
*rhus, no particular novelty is claimed for the conclusions we reach; rather, the objective of this paper
is to put what appears to be a currently unfashionable theory on firmer footing.
There has been a recent resurgence of interests in the problems discussed here, marked most notably
by a recent conference at the Hoover Institution on Corporations and Private Property (the papers of which
were published in the Journal of Law and Economics). The views of many of those papers are at variance
with those presented here.
'For references and a fuller description of these theories, see below, section 2.
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problem, for which it is known that the Nash equilibrium is constrained Pareto
inefficient.' Thus, the model of the firm that we present in section 2 represents an
interpretation of this general multiple-pdncipal-agent problem; in section 3 we
examine the particular biases in resource allocations which it induces. In the fourth
section, we suggest some reforms in our institutions which might alleviate some of
the problems we have identified.
1. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
In the model of primitive capitalism, with each firm controlled by a single owner,
it is commonly argued that the issues with which we are concerned do not arise:
because the owner-manager gets to keep the fhiits of his labors and must bear the
costs of any mistakes that he makes, he will have every incentive to exert the correct
level of effort and to make the correct decisions. This view, however, is correct only
if the probability of default of the firm is zero, an assumption which is as unrealistic
for nineteenth-century firms as it is today. When a firm defaults, part of the costs
of the mistakes of the firm that lead up to the default are borne not by the individual
making the decision, but by his creditors. The recognition of this served as a serious
impediment to the development of the limited liability firm.* The fact that the owner
does not bear the full consequences of his actions has two important implications:
the owner-manager has an incentive to undertake riskier actions than he otherwise
would;' and the lender has an incentive to attempt to control, through one means or
another, the actions of the borrower. We shall return later to the mechanisms by
which lenders can exercise their control.
As we have suggested, the nineteenth-century model of owner-managed firms is
highly inappropriate for modem capitalist economies. Some managers are endowed
with a sense of corporate responsibility: they maximize the stock market value of the
firm because they believe that is what a good manager is supposed to do. They are
'The term "constrained Pareto optimal" is used to remind the reader that in evaluating the efficiency
of the economy, we have explicitly taken into account the costs ol information. The remarkable part of
the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is that it identifies the particular set of assumptions
under which the competitive economy is Pareto efficient; if there are incomplete markets (as there are)
or if there is imperfect information (as there is), then the economy is not, in general, constrained Pareto
efficient (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1984). Though Greenwald and Stiglitz establish that there exists,
in principle, interventions in the market (e.g., taxes and subsidies) that can make everyone better off, a
legitimate question to ask is whether the interventions that would occur through the political process
would indeed be Pareto iniproving. We take no position on this issue. In the last section, we do, however,
suggest some refonns which might improve matters; but we do not necessarily argue that they should be
implemented by legislation, though to the extent that legislation impedes their introduction it may be
desirable to alter it.
It is worth noting that the information problems with which we are concerned here also affect the
structure of competition in other ways; for instance, they naturally lead to the use of long-term
relationships (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1983).
*For a discussion of this, see Allen (1980).
'If the owner-manager were risk neutral, then his payoff function (under limited liability) is
max[/? - (\ + r)B,O], where R is the return to the project, (1 + r)B is the amount that the firm owes
its lenders. (B is the debt; 1 -H r is what is owed on the debt.) This is a convex function, and hence the
owner-manager acts in a risk-loving manner. Even if the owner-manager is risk averse, he will act in a
less risk averse manner (in the sense of Diamond and Stiglitz 1974) than he would have in the absence
of limited liability (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
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individuals who are programmed to act in that manner; and the selection process of
managers entails, in part, a search for individuals who are so programmed.'" But an
important part of standard economic doctrine is that individuals do what is in their
own self-interest. Why is it in the self-interest of nonowner-managers to maximize,
say, the stock market value of the firm?
Three arguments have been put forward—stockholder meetings, takeovers, and
"voting with dollars." I shall now show why none of these is very effective as a
control mechanism.
The Failure of Stockholder Meetings
The stockholder meeting is the forum by which, in a strictly formal legal sense,
stockholders control the management; they can—and in principle should—replace
any manager who fails to take those actions which maximize the stock market value
of the firm. In practice, there is considerable evidence that such meetings are usually
controlled by the management, and theoretical considerations suggest that this
should be the case. Any shareholder views himself as having a negligible effect on
the outcome. Since there is always some cost associated both with obtaining infor-
mation to determine whether a manager is a good manager and with evaluating
alternative management teams, in other words, to voting intelligently, and there is
a negligible benefit, no rational shareholder should expend the resources required to
vote intelligently. We have long recognized that the well functioning of the govern-
ment is a public good, and that because it is a public good, there may be too little
expenditure on resources to ensure that governments function well. But a publicly
held corporation is like a (local) govemment." Ensuring that it functions well is a
public good for all those who own shares in the firm (or who are the firms'
creditors).'^
What is surprising then is not that shareholder meetings generally fail to exercise
effective control over management, but that there are instances in which shareholder
meetings have had an effect."
'*rhere is little doubt that much of human behavior is the result of some kind of conditioning and/or
training. Most individuals when they vote do so because they believe it is their civic duty, not because
they do a careful calculation of the expected costs and benefits of voting. Reward structures in most
universities are such that they must rely almost completely on some vaguely defined sense of re-
sponsibility for individuals to carry out all the tasks that need to be performed in an efficient and effective
manner. This is not to say that selfish (rational) considerations do hot enter; only that one cannot explain
behavior simply by relying on such considerations.
George Akerlof (1970) has provided an insightful "rational" explanation for such seemingly irrational
behavior. Parents like their children to appear to be honest and to have other similar virtues, because these
virtues are rewarded in our society. Ideally, they might prefer that their children appear to be honest but
really be dishonest, for by doing so they would be able both to obtain positions in which they have control
of resources and to divert these resources to their own uses. Unfortunately, or fortunately, it is difficult
to train children to appear to be honest, while they are actually being dishonest. Given this, the "second
best" policy is to train one's children to be honest.
"The analogy is discussed further in Stiglitz (1977).
'^ It has not yet become commonplace in our schools to indoctrinate children in the virtues of exercising
their voting rights over shares in the way that it is conventional to instruct them on the virtues of voting
in public elections.
' ^ e fact that a risk-averse individual would be sufficiently widely diversified so that only a negligible
fraction of his wealth would be tied up in any firm provides further justification for why a rational
individual should not allocate resources to voting intelligently in shareholder meetings.
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The Failure of Takeovers as a Control Device
Takeovers provide a second mechanism by which capital markets are alleged to
ensure that errant managers get replaced. Assume the managers were not maxi-
mizing the market value of the firm. Any individual could come along, purchase the
fum, change the policy to the value-maximizing policy, and reap the resulting
movement in value as the return to his good management. There are at least four
reasons why takeovers have not (and are not likely to be) an effective control
mechanism.'"
First, when it is observed that some firm is not performing well, it may be either
because the management is not good, or because the assets of the fum are not what
they appear to be." The insiders (the managers of the firm) are likely to be more
informed in this regard than are the outsiders. Thus, when those who have a
controlling interest in the firm are willing to sell their shares,'* it indicates that the
individual or furo attempting the takeover has paid too much; if they refuse to sell,
it indicates that the individual or firm attempting the takeover has paid too little:
takeovers will only be successful when the firm taking over pays too much.'^
While the presence of asymmetric information gives rise to problems, so too may
the inability to keep information secret. It is costly to ascertain which of the many
Conversely, if individuals have a significant fraction of their wealth tied up in a firm, and if at the same
time they own a significant fraction of the shares of the firm, so that they may be able to affect the
outcome, then it is rational for them to allocate resources to ensuring that the firm is well managed. But
such individuals are frequently those involved in management, and thus do not provide any check on
management. For an explanation (arising out of imperfect information concerning the characteristics of
different firms) of why the original owners of firms do not become fully diversified and retain a significant
fraction of the shares of the firm they established, see Stiglitz (1982b).
Note that to the extent that such individuals do have an incentive to exercise control, they have an
incentive to exercise it in a way that promotes their own interests. Their interests will not coincide with
those of small shareholders. (This will be true even if they could not divert resources to their own use,
at the expense of other shareholders, i.e., the only differences may be those due to differences in attitudes
towards risk.) See Grossman and Stiglitz (1977, 1980a).
'•"Not all of these may be relevant in any particular situation.
'*rhat is, given the past mistakes of the firm, the firm may now be doing as well with what it has as
anyone else could do.
"This assumes that those who are in a position to determine (or significantly affect) the outcome
of a takeover bid have the interests of shareholders as a whole at heart; often they do not, as we shall
argue below.
"Takeovers are like buying "used firms" just as secondary labor markets are like hiring "used labor."
Akerlof's (1970) original insight into the thinness of used car markets applies here, just as it does to the
used car market (see Stiglitz 1975a; Greenwald 1984). The argument applies, however, with even greater
force to this market than to the labor or used car markets. There, trade might occur because individuals
have different abilities that are specific to different firms or have different tastes for quality of used cars.
Here, it is only differences in ability to manage the firm's assets that are relevant. (With rational
expectations, differences in beliefs alone cannot give rise to trade (see Stiglitz 1982b). For an application
of this general result to takeovers, see Grossman and Hart (1981).) Without entering into the debate on
the empirical literature assessing the effects of takeovers, let me simply assert that I have not found much
convincing evidence that takeovers result in significant increases in the productivity of the firm taken
over. It appears common for the firm taking over to have its market price fall if it is successful. If this
is true, it suggests that the market perceives the "success" of the takeover as evidence that too high a price
has been paid, and it provides further evidence that firms (here the firm taking over) are not controlled
by their shareholders.
Even when there are some firms who have a reasonable idea about the value of a firm, there will be
relatively few such firms, and some firms may have a better idea than others. Thus, the appropriate model
is not the standard, fiilly competitive model, but a bidding model with a limited number of bidders and
possibly asymmetric infomiation.
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firms in our economy are not very well managed and hence undervalued relative to
their potential. Assume that some fum allocated resources to sift through a large set
of fums to identify the most poorly managed one. It then made a takeover bid. This
immediately provides a signal to other fums to evaluate whether the bid represents
an underevaluation of the firm's true worth. If it does, they will then "bid" against
the "discovery" firm; in equilibrium, the entry of these "secondary" bidders will
drive their expected profits to zero; but this implies that the discovery firm, which
has had to expand resources reviewing many firms that are not badly managed, has
a negative expected profit.'*
The third reason that takeover mechanisms are ineffective is related to the same
"public good" argument that arose in our discussion of the inefficacy of stockholder
meetings. If the takeover is successful, and if as a result the market value of a share
is increased, those shareholders who have not sold out get a free ride; since each
small shareholder believes that what he does will have no effect on the outcome
(whether the takeover is or is not successful), it is in the interest of each to withhold
his shares." Only if he believes that the takeover will be successful and will result
in a decline in the value of his shares will he have an incentive to sell.^" Thus,
whereas value-decreasing takeovers are easy (there is a rational expectations equi-
librium in which all such takeovers are successful), value-enhancing takeovers
are not.^'
The fourth reason that takeover mechanisms are ineffective is that the current
managers are often in a position to take strategic actions that deter takeovers.^^
Though the most dramatic of these have only recently come to public attention—
golden parachutes, contingent sales of the firms assets, acquisitions that will result
in antitrust violations if the takeover is successful — other actions, such as long-
"See Stiglitz (1975a). Firms will, in general, employ mixed strategies in making their takeover bids
or in deciding whether they should evaluate a takeover bid to decide whether to compete.
"If there are well-developed option markets, presumably the individual could participate in any gain
and at the same time sell his shares; these option markets have resulted in the creation of a class of
securities that is formally equivalent to nonvoting shares.
^°Note that this problem does not arise when there is a single shareholder. Then (ignoring the problem
of asymmetric information discussed in the previous paragraph), one can think of the firm as continuously
being on auction. It will be sold to the bidder who believes he or she can eam the highest return from
the assets (and the rent will equal the difference between the value of those assets to him or her, and to
the next highest bidder; with a large number of bidders and no significant differences in comparative
advantages in management, this will be essentially zero. Although this argument explains why assets
might be efficiently utilized in a "primitive capitalist economy," it does not work well for modem
capitalism: no entrepreneur has sufficient capital to acquire all of the shares in any one of the major
industrial firms; if he did succeed, he would probably not be able to be sufficiently widely diversified
to act in a risk-neutral manner; and if he succeeded, he would have had to rely on considerable borrowings
from financial institutions, which will impose important constraints on his behavior—a central theme of
this lecture.
Grossman and Hart (1980) have emphasized this explanation of the inefficacy of the takeover mech-
anism. They argue that, as a result, the only way that those taking over a firm can get compensated is
through diverting the firm's resources to their own use. But if those who increase the efficiency of the
firm can do so, so can those who fail to increase the efficiency of the firm; it is difficult for an outsider
to assess whether the firm is or is not being managed efficiently.
''This analysis clearly depends on the rules confronting the firm attempting the takeover. Takeovers
can be made easy if the firm taking over can offer to buy only 51 percent of the shares and can then take
actions that dilute the interests of the minority shareholders. But as we note below, rules that make
value-enhancing takeovers easier may also make value-decreasing takeovers easier, and may indeed result
in the nonexistence of equilibrium. See Stiglitz (1972).
"For a discussion of some of these devices, see Cary (1969-70).
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term contracts with large penalties for breach of contract, restrict the scope of action
of any firm attempting to take over another firm and thus make the takeover
less attractive."
Voting with Dollars
There is a third control mechanism that is often postulated: in analogy to the
Tiebout (1956) model, in the theory of local public goods, where individuals vote
with their feet, here individuals vote with their dollars. Firms that do not use
resources efficiently will not be able to raise additional capital. There are, however,
important limitations to this mechanism (as with the previous two): it is only
effective to the extent that capital must be raised from the market; the managers of
firms have considerable discretion over their cash flow. For some firms, with good
investment opportunities (exceeding their cash flows), the "bribe" of future capital
induces desirable behavior today. (And even then, what being "good" means need
not correspond to "efficient utilization of resources.") But for other firms, with poor
investment opportunities, the threat of the denial of access to future capital is not an
effective control mechanism.
Note, moreover, that when firms do return to the market for additional capital,
they almost invariably turn to banks. There are two reasons for this. The first (which
is discussed in Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984)) is that resorting to the issue
of equities often provides a signal concerning the "quality of the firm" and depresses
the price of the sliares. The second, which is the subject of this paper, is that raising
capital through banks results in more effective control over capital than raising it
through equity markets.^"
Consequences of the Failure of Control Mechanisms
I have argued here that the standard "control mechanisms"—whether they were
or were not effective in the days of primitive capitalism—are at best of only limited
"These are not the only problems with takeovers. If the takeover entails less than 100 percent of the
shares, then the firm taking over niay be able essentially to divert all of the resources of the firm to its
own use. Thus, the firm that is willing to bid the most in a takeover model is not necessarily the one that
will use the resources most effectively, but the one that is most effective in diverting the resources to its
own use. Fraud laws do not stop this diversion, and indeed may put some firms (downstream or upstream
suppliers or purchasers) at an advantage relative to other furos.
But what IS at issue is more than just fraud or the diversion of the resources of the firm to the personal
use of managers. Assume that there are three or more groups of individuals in the population with honest
differences in opinion about how the resources may be best used. Then, type A individuals can buy out
a majority of the shares from type B and change the production plan of the firm. Those who sell
out—those among current owners who are most pessimistic concerning the firm's prospects—may be
slightly better off; those who do not sell are worse off This is true whether current market price goes
up or down; type B individuals believed that, under the original production plan, their expected return
was greater than from other assets (but there were sufficiently few of them that the marginal purchaser
of shares was an individual of another type, say C). At the same time, once A controls the shares of the
firm, type B individuals could buy out a majority of type A individuals. There is no equilibrium. Implicit
in this analysis is an assumption of imperfect competition: individuals enjoy some "surplus" out of the
ownership of the stock of a particular firm; the demand curve for the shares of the firm are downward
sloping. There is considerable evidence in support of this "monopolistic competition" view of the stock
market (see Stiglitz 1972a, 1974, 1975b).
^•^hese are not the only alleged control mechanisms in a capitalist economy. For instance, there are
evolutionary arguments which suggest that firms who manage their resources efficiently will survive,
while those that do not will not. For some criticisms of this argument, see, for instance, Stiglitz (1974,
1982a). 6 , . . B V ,
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effectiveness in modem capitalist economies. Empirical evidence in support of my
position is hard to come by: an essential part of the argument is the difficulty
outsiders face in determining whether a firm is or is not efficiently managed. Still,
there is both direct and indirect evidence in my support. First, the one aspect of
technology that is "public" concems taxes and tax-avoidance behavior. There is a
considerable body of evidence supporting the view that a significant fraction of firms
do not act in such a way as to minimize tax burdens (including both direct, i.e.,
corporate, taxation, and indirect taxation, the taxes shareholders and suppliers of
credit must pay). (For a review of these tax "paradoxes," see Stiglitz (1982a).)"
Second, the persistence, over an extended period of time, of closed-end mutual
funds selling at a discount (implying that the managers had, at each moment, a
strategy that would lead to an increase in market value), and the difficulties that the
few takeovers which were attempted encountered, provides corroborating evidence.
(This is similar to the resistance of many managers to "asset stripping takeovers,"
even when the value of the stripped assets is considerably more than the current
value of the firm.) Third, the behavior of managers in many of the recent take-
over wars seems more consistent with the view put forward here than with the
standard *^
2. BANKS AND THE CONTROL OF CAPITAL
Our problem can now be simply put: how do we ensure that, in a capitalist
economy, those entrusted with the management of its resources, the managers of our
largest corporations, manage those resources efficiently." I have argued that the
traditional control mechanisms are not effective. The central thesis of this paper is
that, to the extent that control is exercised, it is by banks, by lenders, and not by the
owners of equity, in spite of the legal form that invests responsibility for control in
the hands of the owners of equity. But before arguing this, and exploring its
consequences, I need to explain at greater length what I mean by control.
Both the concept of control and its ambiguity are familiar to most of us from
ordinary usage: we talk about losing control of our children, but then admit we
"It would be worth knowing whether the incidence of such seemingly anomalous behavior is greater
among managerially controlled firms than among owner-managed firms.
'^I realize, of course, that, to true believers in the religion of efficient markets and efficient firms, these
arguments will not be completely persuasive. There may be Ptolemaic arguments by which each piece
of evidence might be reconciled with what 1 have loosely termed "traditional" theory. My objective here
is to present a simple, alternative theory that is consistent with the evidence and in which things are what
they seem to be: behavior that appears to be inconsistent with value maximization is in fact inconsistent
with it.
Note, however, that the argument that value-decreasing takeovers may be successful may provide a
rationale for managerial resistance to takeovers, which is consistent with shareholder interests.
"As I have mentioned earlier, what is at stake is more than simple fraud; that, presumably, might be
taken care of by direct legal remedies.
There is a view that managers make little differences to the performance of firms. The evidence usually
cited is that changes in management do not have a significant effect on firm performance. This could be
either because the selection process is sufficiently effective that good managers are replaced by good
managers or because managers make no difference. (Alternatively, and probably more reasonably, though
incompetent managers clearly can destroy a firm, within the range of those who appear to be good, the
effect may be relatively small.)
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never had it; we ask who runs (or controls) the university, but a single source of
power appears to be elusive. In the present context, managers of the firm have
"responsibility" for the management of certain assets; they can assign them to one
use or to another. We say they control the disposition of those assets. But their
control is not unfettered. They (the corporation which they manage) have received
its resources (capital) from banks and from suppliers of equity. Each, in supplying
capital, has imposed conditions on the manager, which circumscribe his actions,
which limit his freedom.^* The constraints which each can impose are markedly
different. The equity owner cannot demand the return of his funds (he can try to
persuade another individual to purchase his shares, but once he has tumed over the
capital to the manager, he cannot force the manager to give him back his money.)
He can exercise his vote in a shareholders meeting. The lender sets a term to the loan;
at the end of the term, he can insist on his money back. If the manager fails to
comply with his request, the lender has certain rights of intervention, defined both
by the loan contract and by statutes. The lender has the right to intervene in other
well-defined circumstances. The loan contract may, for instance, impose restrictions
on additional loans, on what projects the firm may undertake, etc.^' Note that the
rights of the lender to get his money back are circumscribed. But they are undoub-
tedly less circumscribed than the rights of the equity owners to get their money back.
The terms of the contract are both explicit and implicit. Implicit contracts are
enforced not through law but by other means: a borrower who fails to comply with
the terms of the implicit contract may fail to have his loan renewed (and a lender who
fails to renew a loan, all of the implicit terms of which have been complied with,
may find it difficult to find willing borrowers).^" Controllers control controlees not
only directly, by imposing constraints on the set of actions which the controlled
can undertake, but also indirectly, by designing reward structures which induce
the controlled to take actions that are (more) in accord with those attempting to
exercise control.
Thus, managers are partially controlled, directly and indirectly, through both
explicit and implicit contracts and by both lenders and shareholders. The lenders
exert control through both the formal terms of their contract and their refusal to
renew a loan; shareholders exert control through both the voting process and their
refusal to provide additional capital. Managerial incentives are affected by both the
explicit pay schedule—the rewards provided by other firms who might hire them
away, provided their behavior is appropriate—and the implicit punishments pro-
vided by other firms in their treatment of those who are dismissed by their firms (or
whose firms go bankrupt). Both the rewards and punishments and the constraints,
^'These are not the only sources of constraints on his action. The legal system imposed other
constraints; buyers and sellers with whom the firm has contracts impose still further constraints.
^ n some cases, the law restricts the set of interventions that may be stipulated in a loan contract; if
the lender takes too active a position in management, he may lose the advantages that the law assigns
to creditors.
"As in labor contracts, it is not the case that explicit contracts are necessarily better than implicit
contracts. The enforcement of explicit contracts requires not only that violations be observable, but that
they be verifiable by a third party, the court; this is not so for implicit contracts. On the other hand, while
one-period explicit contracts are enforceable, for implicit contracts to be enforceable requires long-term
relationships.
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which determine the action of managers, are set not by a single individual, and not
even by the firm's shareholders and lenders, but by the market as a whole.^' No one
controls the manager: a large number of individuals and institutions affect his
behavior. While the earlier literature^^ attempted to view the manager as the agent
of the supplier of credit (the "principal"), with the supplier of credit designing an
efficient incentive contract for the agent,^^ a more appropriate model is a multiple-
principal-agent model, in which each principal is only allowed to set certain of the
terms of the contract. These problems are, of course, ubiquitous in our economy,
though they have received relatively little attention.
Let me give another example, where each of the principals has a natural set of
controls. Consider a sharecropping economy, in which the tenant needs both capital
and land to produce output. Assume that one individual owns the capital, the other
land. Each writes a contract with the tenant specifying the compensation he is to
receive for supplying his resource. The behavior of the individual is, of course,
affected by the terms of both contracts. There is a kind of externality between the
two contracts: an individual with a large outstanding loan may (in the presence of
provisions for bonded labor) undertake less risk but supply more effort than he
otherwise would have provided.^ There is, as a result, an incentive for the inter-
nalization of these extemaiities; for the landlord, for instance, simultaneously to
provide credit, or at least to force his tenant to disclose what credit contracts he has."
But for a variety of reasons, full intemalization is frequently not possible.'* In those
cases, there will not be a single principal controlling the agent. This is the situation,
I contend, with large joint stock firms. There is no single principal controlling the
manager.
When there are several individuals exerting control, we are wont to ask, who
exerts effective control, or who is most important in exerting control? The question,
I think, is a meaningful one, but is hard to translate into quantitative terms: clearly
"Thus, the threat of a lender to cut off credit would not have much force if the borrower could simply
tum to other suppliers of credit. The threat of an employer to fire a worker would not have much force
if the worker could simply tum to some other employer and obtain the same wage. Market equilibrium
must be such that these threats are effective, that is, there is some cost to being fired or to having one's
credit terminated by the bank that usually provides credit. For an analysis of equilibriums with this
property, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
^^This view was first put forward in Stiglitz (1974), where the analogy between the problem of the
landlord, attempting to elicit effort from his workers, and the owner of capital, attempting to elicit effort
from his manager, was drawn (see also Ross 1973). Since then, a huge literature on the principal-agent
problem has developed, emphasizing not only the problem of eliciting the correct level of effort, but also
the problem of ensuring that the manager undertakes the correct amount of risk.
Although it should be emphasized that "efficient" in this sense is only a local concept, given the
prices, etc. on the market, the principal cannot be made better off without making the agent worse off.
The market equilibrium is not, however, in general Pareto efficient. See Amott and Stiglitz (1983a) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1984).
"The extemality is reciprocal: the terms of the tenancy contract affect the probability of default on the
loan. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Braverman and Stiglitz (1982).
"For a more general discussion of these extemaiities in the context of principal-agent (moral hazard)
problems, see Amott and Stiglitz (1983b). For an excellent discussion in terms of the multiple-principal-
agent problem, see Bemheim and Whinston (1984).
"Limitations on information may make it impossible to enforce "exclusive" contracts. Altematively,
a single principal may not have control of all the resources required by the agent. Thus, the landlord may
not have sufficient capital or the required bullocks. Presumably, he could obtain these resources from the
same supplier that the tenant does; but this would simply introduce a new principal-agent problem.
A further limitation may be imposed by the fact that if the principal supplies all the resources required
by the agent, the principal becomes too dependent, for his welfare, on the behavior of the agent: there
is insufficient risk diversification.
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agent A exerts more effective control than agent B if agent A can impose all the same
constraints and rewards that agent B can, and then some. But usually, agent A can
do some things that agent B cannot, and conversely. Equity owners can do some
things that lenders cannot (they can vote at shareholder meetings), and lenders can
do some things that equity owners cannot. This is not the occasion to attempt a
precise definition (and it is hardly necessary for my purpose). I hope that the intuitive
notions that I will present here will suffice for the moment.
In determining who exercises effective control, what is relevant is not only the
rights and means of intervention but also the incentives: intervention is only de-
sirable if it effects an improvement in behavior on the part of the agent (from the
point of view of the "intervenor"). To ascertain this, the intervenor has to be
informed about both the current course of action of the manager and the alternatives.
But information is costly.
Here we obtain the basic dilemma: if the manager were to receive all of his
resources from a single supplier, then that supplier would have an incentive to gather
information to ascertain that the manager acted in the interests of the supplier. But
then the supplier would have to bear considerable risk; he might not be adequately
diversified. On the other hand, it is not in the interests of any shareholder or small
lender to devote much attention to the performance of a firm; for any gains that
accrue to him as a result of his actions accrue to all similarly situated suppliers.
There is the free-rider problem which we discussed earlier.
Thus, though both lenders and equity owners have certain rights to control
managers, they do not individually have the incentives required to induce them to
exercise those rights. The conclusion: managers are not effectively controlled.
If this were the end of the story, the prospects for large-scale capitalism would
have indeed been dim. Given that managers could not be effectively controlled, no
one would tum over to them the capital required for the development of modem
industry. There are, however, three control mechanisms, which, though they work
imperfectly, work sufficiently well that individuals are willing to tum over capital
to others.
A. Banks. The most important of these, I suspect, are banks (both the lending
banks and the investment banks, which assist in the raising of capital). Banks
frequently take large positions in a firm; the nature of the loan contract enables them
to do this without undertaking undue risk. At the same time, the nature of the
contract enables them to focus their attention on information gathering to a particular
set of issues: those associated with the probability of default and the net worth of the
firm in those low-retum states. They need not concem themselves with either how
good the best prospects of the firm are or what the probability is that the firm will
make off like a bandit.
Since they are concemed with low-probability events, and since the managerial-
incentives structure is such as to encourage managers to avoid those events, the
payoff to banks exercising very effective control is limited." We shall retum to
this later.
"Collateral reduces the risk to the bank even further and, except for avoiding disastrous outcomes,
also reduces the incentives for exercising close control.
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This argument says that the "public good of management" problem for lenders is
resolved by having a single lender. This is not always the case: frequently there are
syndicated loans, in which a single bank takes; the "lead" position and undertakes
responsibility for ensuring that the borrower is eflfectively controlled (from the
perspective of the lender.)'^ Here, the problem of public management as a public
good is resolved by means of reputation: it is in the interest of each bank to ensure
that the loans on which it acts as the lead banker are good, lest other banks refuse
to participate in the loans it attempts to syndicate.^'
B. Concentrated equity ownership. Inthecaseofdebt,, the problem was resolved
by having a single supplier (or having the several suppliers act cooperatively). In the
case of a large, widely held firm, the number of shareholders is sufficiently large and
there is sufficient anonymity about who the shareholders are that the same mech-
anism will not work. But if there are a few shareholders, each of whom has enough
stake in the firm that his private incentives for controlling the manager are suf-
ficiently great, then there will be a sufficiently large expenditure on information
acquisition by these individuals that effective control will be exerted. (The small
shareholders will continue to "free ride" on the efiforts of the larger shareholders; the
standard arguments suggest that as a result theie will be an insufficient expenditure
on resources for controlling managers, at least fom the point of view of the
shareholders as a class.) This has a cost: the limited diversification which these
individuals can achieve. Moreover, the interests of these shareholders may well not
coincide with the interests of the small shareholders."" Presumably, for individuals
to be willing to undertake this limited risk diversification, they must be compen-
sated, for example, by being allowed to divert some of the resources of the firm to
their own use (such as high fees for being on the board of directors).""
''As usual, the problems of incentives and screening aie barcf to disteguish: the lead bank is also
responsible for ascertaining the suitability of the borrower for the loan.
"The enforcement of cooperative equilibrium in raultiperiod ^ m e s has been the subject of extensive
recent research. Though most of these studies have assumed no fiscounting, and therefore are of limited
usefulness for our purposes, several recent studies have incorporated discounting. See, in particular,
Abreu (1983).
As in the usual analysis, in a one-period model it would pay each bank to cheat: to syndicate a loan,
but then to fail to expend tiie resources required to enstire that the lender used the funds properly. In a
multiperiod context, this is not true. A bank that "lost hs teputatfon" and could not syndicate its loans
would have to bear greater risk. This "risk premium" can be viewed as the punishment for failing to
exercise control. Note that the number of banks involved is sufficiently small so that each bank can assess
the reputation of the other banks.
A similar reputation mechanism operates in the case of investment banks attempting to raise capital
by means of bonds. Then, the bank agrees to act as "trustee" for the bondholders, exerting certain control.
Tlie argument does not carry over, however, to investment banks attempting to raise equity capital. After
the equity is raised, the bank usually plays no role in ensuring that the firm's managers do what they
should. The responsibility of the investment bank is Gmitedi to that of scieenfng. (This is not quite true
for venture capital and private placements.)
**The fact tfiat a wealthier individual owns more shares of a; firm does not necessarily imply that he
has greater incentives for information acquisition and for exercising control: if the value of his time
increases proportionately, then the cost of obtaining informatioir rises with the retum.
"'If this were the only retum extracted by such shareboldJets, it woaldbe a small price to pay for the
management of the public good. Unfortunately, apart firom the other control mechanisms discussed here,
there seems considerable discretion for the controlling shareholders and managers to cooperate in the
diversion of resources from the common good of sharefaofd^s to their own benefit.
Note that there are other reasons for limited diversificatioti: the original fotinder of a firm may wish
to signal his confidence in the firm by retaining a considBrablc proportion of the shares (see Stiglitz
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C. Managerial reputations. The third control mechanism is the concem of the
manager for his good reputation. Others, both in his firm and outside, are judging
his behavior. If he behaves "well" then he is apt to be promoted or to be bid away
by some other firm. If he behaves in a way that is perceived to be "bad," at the very
least his outside opportunities will be reduced; at the worst the firm will go bankrupt,
the creditors will intervene, and he will be out of a job. He always risks the
possibility of an internal coup d'etat: underlings or outsiders attempting to convince
the board of directors that they ojuld do a better job.''^
Managers are affected, of course, not only by their reputations, but also by their
compensation schedule. Some have suggested this as an explanation, for instance,
for stock options. Interestingly entMigh, a recent study by Larson (1984) of stock
option incentive plans instituted over an extended period of time showed that firms
with these plans did no better (in terms of stock market value) than the market as
a whole. There are few firms wife managerial-incentive plans which are even
roughly in accord widi what economic theory would predict."^
3. BIASES IN THE CONTROL MECHANISMS
Shareholders do not control the firm. We have posited here a set of altemative
control mechanisms. Managers do respond to these controls. I wish to argue that,
1982b). Firms that are controlled by the original founder represent a cross between the primitive
capitalism discussed in section 1 and advanced capitalism under discussion here.
Just as the original founder of the firm may ictain a significant fraction of shares in the firm to signal
his confidence in the finn (and thvis to increase Ae market value of the firm), so too has he an incentive
to design the corporate charter in such a way as to provide "good incentives" to subsequent managers;
presumably the market will reward him from doing so by increasing his current market value. Though
there is obviously some truth in iJiis argument, frequently when the corporate charter is drawn up, the
founder has no intention of retiring; frequently, he has a contract with the firm which requires that he
continue to provide certain services, for an extended period of time. Thus the present discounted value
to designing contract terms that provide better incentives for some potential future manager, in ten,
twenty, or thirty years time is likely to be small; the founder is best advised to direct his attention to other
problems.
"^The fact that the board of directors often includes many individuals from management should not
obscure the fact that the different managers and different members of the board have different incentives:
they need not act as a team. It is obviously risky for the president of a firm to attempt to overthrow the
CEO, but such palace revolutions are not tkat uncommon.
" 'A notable exception is the recently instituted executive compensation plan of TRW. Stock option
plans reward the manager but not in terms of how his performance compares with others in comparable
situations; such compensation depends on the performance of the stock market as a whole. Why should
executives be forced to bear this risk? Doing so has one advantage in principle: managers should be more
concemed with the correlation of the firm's return with the market. There is little evidence that this was
an important consideration in the adoption cf these plans or that it has been an important consequence
of them. Indeed, if it were, contracts with managere should impose restrictions on their purchase of index
options or other shares in the market. (Today, with futures markets, managers may be able to divest
themselves of the market risk associated with being paid both options.)
The standard argument concerning the tax advantages are fallacious; indeed, quite the contrary, even
if the pay were to be made dependent on the performance of the firm, it is advantageous to pay the bonus
directly, rather than through stock options (seeStiglitz 1982a). (When 1 presented this argument recently
to a conference in which a number of parfidpants were responsible for designing the executive compen-
sation programs for some large American firms, no countervailing argument was presented.)
It is interesting to note that when most stock option plans are instituted, the executive does not appear
to bear more risk: they are introduced as supplements (allegedly at little cost to shareholders) to their
salary structures. For a discussion of reMiwe performance based incentive structures, see Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983).
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as a result, fmns do not maximize their stock market value;"*^  whether there are other
institutional arrangements which would ensure that capital would be more effec-
tively utilized is a question to which I shall tum in the next section.
There are systematic biases associated with each of the control mechanisms
described in the preceding section. Lenders are only concemed with the bottom part
of the tail of the distribution of retums. Thus, they may require that the firm
undertake projects with relatively little (bottom-tail) risk, even though the expected
retum is much lower. (Or, they may induce the fum to do the same thing through
their indirect control devices, the control of the terms of the loan contract, the
conditions under which they renew credit, the collateral which they require, or the
interest rate which they charge.) In reducing the probability of default, they ensure
that the manager does not abscond with the firm's funds, and thus provide a public
good for all investors. But in other respects, the interests of banks and equity owners
are antithetical. The bank, because it can withdraw funds, is in a position to exercise
control: managers respond to the demands of their bankers."*'
Managers' concem for their reputation, and their knowledge that judgments will
frequently be made (implicitly) based on their relative performance, means that they
may "follow the pack." If convention has it that the fum should pay dividends, then
the managers instruct the firm to pay dividends, whether or not it is in the best
interests of shareholders. Any manager of a large, publicly held fum who attempted
to explain the dividend paradox to his shareholders would be considered flaky, and
his future prospects diminished.''* The firm's managers may ask the firm to pay them
whatever convention dictates that managers of such firms get paid, regardless of the
opportunity cost of the managers' time, and regardless of what it could obtain
essentially similar managers for. Although the executives of the automobile industry
were quick to claim their desserts for having brought the industry back to profit-
ability (in spite of the significantly negative effects that these bonuses had on
labor relations), they were not as quick to accept blame (and the commensurate pay
reductions) when they led the industry to all-time losses."^ Managers are (at best)
temporary trustees of the firm's assets, and their reward structures are for the most
part directed at current retums: few firms compensate their managers on the basis
of the firm's performance ten or twenty years hence. Few, if any, require that the
individual retain shares in the firm long after they have completed their term as chief
in itself does not mean that the economy is not constrained Pareto efficient; resources are not
being used as effectively as they would be if infomiation were costless, but this is a relatively unin-
teresting statement. It is, however, well known by now that whenever there are principal-agent (incentive)
problems, the economy is not even constrained Pareto inefficient (see Amott and Stiglitz 1983b; Green-
wald and Stiglitz 1984).
• "^e term of the loan poses an interesting problem to the lender. On the one hand, short-term loans
give the lender a right to his money back (or to intervene) at any date; but lenders cannot continuously
monitor, and in the intervening periods borrowers may take actions that make it impossible to repay. They
thus force the hand of the lender: he either renews the contract or takes the risk of getting what he can
out of bankruptcy. It may be more efficient for the lender to commit himself to supplying funds over
a certain extended period, effectively giving up some of his rights to intervention (see Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981).
•^Presumably, by the time the individual has reached this rung of the corporate ladder, any such
tendencies have been identifted and the individual barred from further progression.
"So long as the firm is making record profits, the lenders have no interest in restricting these payments;
equity owners do, but for the reasons we have given above, they have no effective control.
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executive. Yet the retum on many long-term investments will not occur until some
time in the future. Keynes, in the General Theory, expressed a concem that in-
vestors in the stock market were merely concemed with short-term gains, not the
long-term retums. Today, increasingly, similar allegations are brought against the
managers of many of America's largest enterprises: the heads of these enterprises are
financial experts, not production experts. Their job is to allocate capital. And their
perspective is not unlike that of the Keynesian investor: they wish to find under-
priced assets, just before those assets are discovered by others, so that they can reap
a short-term capital gain. Their behavior is not surprising: what incentive do they
have to be concemed about the long-term prospects of the firm or the productivity
of the economy?**
Small shareholders, since they cannot exercise control directly, must rely on the
other control mechanisms. Large equity owners may have, as we have suggested,
some incentives to exercise control, but their interests may well not coincide with
those of the small shareholders. Similarly, though small shareholders may recognize
that the interests of the lenders and those of small equity owners are not coincident,
they know that the lenders' concem that the firm not abscond with the funds ensures
some degree of safety for their investment; and that since managers in general
have some stake in the outcome of the fum, their incentives will at least partially
be coincident.
4. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Our arguments, if they are correct, suggest that the traditional view of how
capitalist economies work is at best oversimplified and at worst simply wrong.
Managers have considerable discretion: the control mechanisms work only imper-
fectly. Though the earlier Berle-Means view that managers control firms and the
March-Simon view that they simply satisfice may be incomplete, these views may
provide a more accurate description of fum behavior than the other extreme view
that fums maximize their stock market value. Managers face a variety of constraints
and a variety of incentives, imposed by a variety of institutions. Managers of large
corporations whose stock is widely held undoubtedly behave in ways which are
•''Their position should be contrasted with that of the owner-manager under primitive capitalism,
whose dynastic ambitions included leaving his firm to his heirs. Such individuals were not concemed with
what they might be able to sell their firm for on a day-to-day basis, but with the long-term prospects of
the firm.
Evidence that managers are particularly concemed with the short-run prospects of the firm is provided
by such so-called tax paradoxes as the extensive use of FIFO inventory accounting in inflationary times
and the long lags in the shift to accelerated depreciation. The standard explanation of these phenomena
is that managers were concemed that, were they to make these changes, the market would misinterpret
the decline in accounting profits, and as a result the current market price would decline. This decline
would occur despite the fact that the real (after tax) value of the firm should have increased. (If investors
continued to behave naively on the basis of current reported profits, future values would eventually
increase.)
Clearly, if the current market price accurately reflected the long-run prospects of the firm, there would
be no discrepancy between maximizing current market valuation and long-run market valuation. In an
economy in which there is an incomplete set of risk and futures markets, and investors are imperfectly
informed conceming the activities of the firm, there is no reason to believe that the two will be perfectly
congment. The tax paradoxes described earlier provide illustrations of this.
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markedly different from that of an owner-manager. We have identified a number of
biases: lenders are more concemed with avoiding defaults than with maximizing
retums, and managers are more concemed with short-run profitability than the
long-run prospects of the firm.
The question arises, are there some institutional reforms which, if not ensuring
complete efficiency, at least may improve matters?
Before putting forward some tentative suggestions, let me restate what I see to be
the problems. First, the resources required by most large industrial enterprises are
beyond the capabilities of any single individual; or even if one individual had the
resources, he would have to bear more risk than he would like. What has evolved
is a system in which there are two (or occasionally more) broadly defined classes of
suppliers of capital. One class (equity) has a large number of participants; for each,
the management of the firm represents a public good; because the effective exercise
of control is costly, each individual is willing to be a free rider, and the consequence
is that this class, which has nominal control, cannot effectively exercise it. The other
class, lenders, has a small number of participants, and the institutional arrangements
provide a mechanism by which the free-rider problems can be alleviated. Each of
these classes has its own interests and its limited means of control. It is as if there
is a multiple-principal/single-agent (or multiple-agent) problem, for which the Nash
equilibrium (even ignoring the free-rider problems) is not efficient.
Our objective then is to find institutional arrangements that reduce the free-rider
problem, that extend control to those for whom infomiation is relatively costless,
and that provide incentive structures such that those who are in a position to exercise
control take into account the consequences for all the affected groups.
There are two tentative suggestions that I wish to put forward. Neither is without
its problems. While I am not convinced that these reforms are desirable, I am
convinced that there is considerable scope for institutional innovation in our
economy: the malaise of our economy, as well as our theoretical analysis, suggests
that we cannot rely on nineteenth-century ideology for our views of how the
economy should be organized.
Both suggestions are based on the recognition of the importance of costs of
monitoring: to have control effectively exercised, those exercising it must have a
strong incentive for doing so. There are two institutions that have such incentives:
banks and unions (as representatives of the workers)."" One of the central problems
with banks' exercise of their control function was their excessive concem for the
lower tail of the distribution. This bias might be alleviated by allowing banks (or
perhaps better, a related but independent subsidiary) to own equity shares in firms.
Information could be shared between the bank and its equity subsidiary; and the
bank, in exercising its control over the management, might be induced to look
not only towards the bottom tail of the distribution of retums, but also towards
the mean.'"
"'If labor markets were perfectly cornpetitive, and there were no costs associated with individuals
changing jobs, then workers would have little interest in the prospects of their firms; but both assumptions
are counterfactual.
'*rhis proposal is not without its problems: the bank, knowing that its depositors are insured through
the FDIC, might be willing to expose them to greater risks, in order to eam greater retum on its equity
subsidiary.
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The other major institution that is in a position to extend its powers of control is
the unions. They have one advantage over virtually all other institutions: they (or
their members) are intimately involved in the day-to-day functioning of the firm, and
hence the costs of acquiring (certain kinds of) information conceming the firm are
likely to be less than for others. They have a second advantage: they, like the banks,
have a strong interest in the survival of the firm. The workers collectively may have
the largest undiversified stake in the firm." It has increasingly become recognized
that the traditional adversarial role between management and workers is inap-
propriate: it is not a zero sum game. We have argued that workers (unions) have both
the information base and the incentive to exercise surveillance and control. But will
they do so only in their own narrow interests? The development of huge pension
funds provides a vehicle by which a greater coincidence of interests can be achieved:
if a significant fraction of the pension funds are invested in the firm, they will have
an interest in ensuring that the managers take actions which are in the interests of
shareholders as well. Employee stock ownership programs may go even further in
reducing the divergence of interests between workers and shareholders."
There has long been a tradition that workers should work, and managers manage.
This separation of functions may have been appropriate under primitive capitalism;
but as we have argued, the problem of a modem joint stock company is not
appropriately modeled as a single-principal/multiple-agent problem; rather it is
a multiple-principal/multiple-agent problem, for which the Nash equilibrium is
almost invariably inefficient. Each participant (or class of participants) pursuing his
own interests, given the set of controls at his disposal, results in resource allocations
The recent episodes of large banks becoming overly committed to certain classes of correlated risks
(oil and gas loans; loans to LDCs) raises questions conceming the ability of banks to perform the control
functions that are under discussion here; it has been suggested that given the insurance provided by the
FDIC (both explicit and implicit) these decisions may indeed have been the correct ones from the
perspective of expected retum to the owners, of the bank, or in any case were natural consequences of
the incentive stmctures facing loan officers.
Concems about banks using their position to restrict competition are, I suspect, exaggerated, so long
as the industries are subject to intemational competitive pressures and so long as the FTC and Justice
Department maintain surveillance over anticompetitive practices. Moreover, what is at issue is not tuming
over all control to these banking institutions, only extending their roles to induce them to take the interests
of shareholders more into account.
Throughout the discussion I have assumed that banks are concemed with avoiding defaults. Though
banks should be concemed with this, I have frequently been asked in presentations of this talk if there
is not a similar principal-agent problem facing banks. How do we know that the bank loan officers do
not pursue some other policies? And if they do not, are we not simply shifting the focus of control from
one set of managers (those of the firms) to another set of managers (those of the banks)? In reply, I have
two comments. First, I am not arguing that managers are completely uncontrolled, but rather that they
have a large amount of discretion. At the same time, I believe that a change in the incentives structures
(payoffs) to the bank will be reflected in the incentive structures facing its managers, at least to some
extent. Second, I am not arguing here that these banks (bank managers) should be given more control,
but that we should consider altemative institutional arrangements which will make it more likely that they
take actions more in accord with the interests of shareholders.
"In the event of a bankruptcy, the loss to workers (the wages lost while they fmd altemative
unemployment, and the retum to specific training loss) may exceed the loss to the suppliers of capital.
Moreover, these losses may represent, individually, a larger fraction of the wealth of workers than the
corresponding losses are for the suppliers of capital.
"This proposal too is not without its problems. To the extent that workers invest their saving
(pensions) in the firm, they bear greater risks than they otherwise would.
Moreover, it is not always clear that unions act in the interests of their members. Unions can be viewed
as an attempt to solve the problem of public good for workers, but as in any such institution, there is
always the possibility of significant differences between the interests of the elected officials and those they
are intended to serve.
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that are not Pareto efficient. The actions of each group have important consequences
for all other groups (there are important extemaiities). Moreover, we have repeatedly
made note of the public good nature of good management: that it is not in the
interests of any small member of the class of capital suppliers to devote resources
to ensure that the interests of his class are pursued by the firms' managers. (And to
the extent that actions which benefit the members of one class have spillovers onto
members of other groups, each group's supply of "surveillance" services will be
too small.)
Our problem is to design insitutional structures that serve to internalize some of
these extemaiities, that take advantage of those who are in the best position to obtain
information and exercise control (surveillance), and that can ameliorate (although
obviously not eliminate) some of the free-rider problems which are inherent in the
maintenance of good management. The two proposals we have put forward here are
aimed at those objectives: whether they go far enough or whether they would be
accompanied by more than offsetting advantages remains to be seen."
At the very least, I hope my analysis has convinced you of the inappropriateness
of the nineteenth-century model of owner-manager capitalism as a description of
twentieth-century capitalism. There is no simple answer to the question of who
controls the firm. But what is clear is that minority shareholders do not exercise
control, that banks are in a better position to exercise some control over managers,
and that to the extent that they do exercise control, there are important biases in
the decisions made. Our system may work well, but I suspect that there is room
for improvement: social innovations are no less important than technological
innovations.'^
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